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ABSTRACT: This study aims to investigate whether personal costs, seriousness 
level of fraud and organizational commitment play a role in influencing 
whistleblowing intentions. It is also intended to prove whether organizational 
commitment has a mediating effect on the relationship among personal costs, 
seriousness level, and whistleblowing intentions. The research subjects comprise 
of civil servants or contract employees of Government Institutions of 
Regencies/Cities in Aceh Province, Indonesia. The hypotheses were tested on 103 
respondents who were selected using convenience sampling method. The data 
were collected using survey questionnaires sent via online using Google Form 
from May to July 2017. The data were analyzed using Structural Equation 
Modeling-Partial Least Square (SEM-PLS). The results of this study showed that 
personal costs and seriousness level of fraud influenced whistleblowing 
intentions. Nevertheless, it appeared that organizational commitment did not 
influence whistleblowing intentions. This study also proved that organizational 
commitment did not have a mediating effect on the relationship among personal 
costs and level of seriousness and whistleblowing intentions. 
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Introduction 
 
Whistleblowing is a term used in sports which depicts a referee blowing 
his/her whistle to stop a player who makes a foul. In the context of an 
organization, whistleblowing indicates a way which can be used to stop a 
foul or fraud occurring in an organization. Currently, institutions are 
encouraged to develop a whistleblowing policy as a part of their internal 
control system (Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Hooks, Kaplan, & Schultz, 1994; 
Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991), even as a wider movement to make these 
institutions more transparent and accountable (Gobert & Punch, 2000) or 
to prevent a country from suffering from possible severer losses and law 
breaches which may occur (Rustiarini & Sunarsih, 2008). 
 
In accounting research, researchers agree to define whistleblowing as the 
 
 
 
 
AFFILIATION: 
1 Accounting Department, 
Universitas Syiah Kuala, Aceh, 
Indonesia.  
 
*CORRESPONDENCE: 
mirna_indriani@unsyiah.ac.id  
 
THIS ARTICLE IS AVAILABLE IN: 
http://journal.umy.ac.id/index.php/ai  
 
DOI: 10.18196/jai.2002121 
 
CITATION: 
Indriani, M., Yulia, A., Nadirsyah, 
& Ariska, L. P. (2019). 
Whistleblowing Intention, 
Personal Cost, Organizational 
Commitment and Fraud 
Seriousness Level. Journal of 
Accounting and Investment, 
20(2), 129-151. 
 
ARTICLE HISTORY 
Received: 
11 October 2018 
 
Reviewed: 
23 Desember 2018 
 
Revised: 
30 January 2019 
 
Accepted: 
31 January 2019 
Indriani, Yulia, Nadirsyah, & Ariska 
Whistleblowing Intention, Personal Cost, Organizational Commitment and Fraud Seriousness Level 
 
 
Journal of Accounting and Investment, May 2019 | 130 
action of revealing by a (former or current) member of an organization regarding an 
individual or organization’s illegal, immoral or unlawful practices (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; 
Keenan, 2000; King, 1997; Miceli & Near, 1984; Miceli, Near, Rehg, & van Scotter, 2012; 
Near & Miceli, 1996). The parties revealing or reporting these illegal practices are known 
as whistleblowers (Jeon, 2017; Sweeney, 2008) 
 
Some studies found that whistleblowing is the most effective way to deal with fraud 
(Alam, 2014; Rizki Bagustianto & Nurkholis, 2012; Dyck, Morse, & Zingales, 2010; Said, 
Alam, Mohamed, & Rafidi, 2017; Sweeney, 2008). The effectiveness of whistleblowing in 
revealing financial statements fraud is acknowledged by accountants and regulators not 
only in the United States, but also in other countries (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008). 
 
One’s Intention or interest to do this whistleblowing or to become a whistleblower is a 
hard decision to make (Brennan & Kelly, 2007) and it involves highly complicated 
processes (Miceli, 2004). The factors which influence the Intention to do whistleblowing 
, among other things, are: personal cost (Alam, 2014; Aliyah, 2015; Alleyne, Hudaib, & 
Pike, 2013; Bagustianto & Nurkholis, 2012; Hanif & Odiatma, 2017; Lestari & Yaya, 2017; 
Libriani & Utami, 2015), fraud seriousness level (Ahmad, Smith, & Ismail, 2013; Ahmad, 
Yunos, Ahmad, & Sanusi, 2014; Aliyah, 2015; Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; Bagustianto & 
Nurkholis, 2012; Hanif & Odiatma, 2017; King, 1997; K. M. King, 2003; Miceli & Near, 
1985), communication channel (Yuswono & Hartijasti, 2018), and organizational 
commitment (Ahmad, Smith, & Ismail, 2012; Aliyah, 2015; Bagustianto & Nurkholis, 
2012; Husniati, Hardi, & Wiguna, 2017; Lestari & Yaya, 2017; Wahyuningsih, 2016). 
 
The personal cost is the whistleblower’s perception of retaliation risk or sanction to be 
received for doing the whistleblowing. The greater an individual’s perceived personal 
cost, the less likely this individual to be interested in doing the whistleblowing 
(Bagustianto & Nurkholis, 2012; Schultz, Johnson, Morris, & Dyrnes, 1993) or they have 
a negative relationship (Alleyne, Charles-Soverall, Broome, & Pierce, 2017). 
Nevertheless, some studies found that personal cost does not affect whistleblowing 
intention (Bagustianto & Nurkholis, 2012; Hanif & Odiatma, 2017; Setyawati, Ardiyani, & 
Sutrisno, 2015). 
 
Fraud seriousness level is the materiality level of a fraud occurring in an institution. Any 
member noticing suspected fraud will be more likely to do the whistleblowing if the 
fraud is serious or material (Miceli & Near, 2005). Some studies find that fraud 
seriousness level influences whistleblowing intention (Bagustianto & Nurkholis, 2012; 
Cassematis & Wortley, 2013; Hakim, Subroto, & Andayani, 2017; Setyawati et al., 2015). 
Yet, some other studies find the opposite (Alleyne et al., 2017; Hanif & Odiatma, 2017). 
 
A strong organizational commitment within an individual will make them try their best 
to achieve the institution’s predetermined goals (Setyawati et al., 2015). Previous 
studies find a gap on this topic, i.e., some researchers find that organizational 
commitment has an influence on whistleblowing intention (Bagustianto and Nurkholis, 
2012; Husniati et al., 2017) and some others find that organizational commitment has 
no influence on whistleblowing intention (Lestari & Yaya, 2017; Setyawati et al., 2015). 
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This gap found by previous studies motivates the researchers to conduct this study, 
particularly by observing such variables as personal cost, fraud seriousness level and 
organizational commitment on whistleblowing intention. In this study, the 
organizational commitment variable was treated as an intervening variable, assuming 
that personal cost or fear of retaliation level would be lower if an individual did the 
whistleblowing for having high commitment. Also in this study, the organizational 
commitment was treated as an intervening variable between fraud seriousness level 
and whistleblowing intention, expecting that the high commitment would influence an 
individual to report fraud regardless of its size. Treating the organizational commitment 
variable as an intervening variable made this study different from previous studies 
(Lestari & Yaya, 2017). 
 
The research was conducted in regency/municipality government institutions in Aceh 
Province with employees, both contract ones and civil servants, working at the 
government institutions of regencies/municipalities in Aceh Province as the 
respondents. Aceh Province consisted of 23 regencies and municipalities. All these 
regencies/municipalities and the province itself since 2016 had obtained Reasonable 
Without Exception (RWE) opinion. Despite obtaining RWE opinion from BPK, it is not 
necessarily impossible that fraud would not occur (BPK Perwakilan Provinsi Aceh (BPK 
Representative for Aceh Province), 2017). For example, in 2017 the total state losses 
resulting from corruption case was Rp35 billions, and this number increased significantly 
in 2018 to Rp398 billions. The swindle was committed to APBD (regional budget), and 
Special Autonomy or Otonomi Khusus (Otsus) funds under the pretext of requesting 
commitment fee in each project, bribery for licensing, and mark-up for procuring goods 
and services (Mukhtar & Maharani, 2018). The culprits of these corruptions in Aceh 
were from executive boards, private and companies (Nashrullah, 2019). 
 
The phenomenon of a massive number of frauds has led to the need for conducting 
research on whistleblowing system which can be used as an early warning in disclosing 
fraud, namely through whistleblowing. Not many studies have been conducted on 
whistleblowing in Indonesia. Thus not many empirical shreds of evidence are available 
yet to be used in enriching the theories people can refer to in solving the existing 
problems. This phenomenon of a large number of frauds shows that many weaknesses 
are still there in the practical world. Thus it is necessary to conduct a study on the 
factors which influence whistleblowing which can be used as an early warning for any 
organization to deal with any possible fraud. 
  
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
The Theory of Prosocial Behavior 
 
Theory of prosocial behavior is the one used by researchers to explain what 
whistleblowing is conceptually and empirically (Alleyne et al., 2013; Brennan & Kelly, 
2007; Brief & Motowidlo, 1986; Miceli & Near, 1988). Prosocial behavior is defined as 
the behavior which is performed: (a) by members of an institution; (b) directed toward 
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an individual, group, or institution; and (c) to achieve the individual, group, or 
institution’s welfare (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986). 
 
Whistleblowing is considered as a positive social behavior (Miceli et al., 2008) by people 
in general since a whistleblower can put an end to errors or fraud, intended to provide 
benefits to the people within or beyond the institution (Ahmad, 2011). This theory is the 
one which explains whistleblowing as a mechanism for internal and social control 
(Vinten, 1996). Dozier and Miceli (1985) also explains that whistleblowing is a prosocial 
behavior which involves altruistic and egoistic motives. Dozier and Miceli’s opinion is 
not different from Ahmad (2011) who suggests that whistleblowing is not necessarily 
altruistic in nature, rather to some extent, a whistleblower might also have a motive of 
obtaining personal benefit or welfare. 
 
In particular, the prosocial approach of whistleblowing is based on Latane and Darley's 
(1968) work on observer intervention model. This model states that an observer will 
make a response by offering assistance under the emergency circumstance. There are 
five steps of deciding to have whistleblowing behavior, and each step is highly critical in 
making the whistleblowing decision. These five steps include: (1) observer should be 
aware of the incident; (2) observer should decide that the incident is emergency; (3) 
observer should decide that he/she is responsible for assisting; (4) observer should 
choose the right assistance method, and 5) observer applies the intervention (Latane & 
Darley, 1968). These are the five steps in making ethical decisions for informant 
candidates and thus highlighting the ethical dilemma inherent to the decision to do the 
whistleblowing (Brennan & Kelly, 2007). 
 
According to Brief and Motowidlo (1986), the theory of prosocial behavior has 
antecedent variables which are divided into two parts. The first one is individual 
antecedent, i.e., the aspect coming from an individual (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986). This 
is despite the many debates on whether humans are biologically more likely to behave 
prosocially (Campbell, 1979; Wispé, 1972). Hoffman (1981) collects many sociobiological 
and psychological evidence which support that altruism, at least, is a part of human’s 
basic characters. Altruism is the trait of putting others’ interest first. An example of the 
individual antecedent is an individual’s ability in believing justice standards and an 
individual’s commitment to a social environment. The second one is contextual 
antecedent, i.e., the aspect from an institutional and environmental context of the way 
moral reasonings such as norm factors, group cohesivity, role model, leadership style, 
organizational climate, pressure and, organizational commitment work (Brief & 
Motowidlo, 1986). 
 
Whistleblowing Intention 
 
The Intention is a strong wish to do something which comes from within oneself 
(Kreshastuti & Prastiwi, 2014). The intention will affect behavior since it should occur 
first before doing any behavior. With no Intention, this behavior can never occur. The 
intention may change as time changes. The wider the time interval, the more likely for 
this Intention to change (Hanif & Odiatma, 2017). 
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Whistleblowing Intention is different from actual whistleblowing since interest occurs 
before performing the actual whistleblowing, or in other words whistleblowing 
intention is needed to make the actual whistleblowing occur (Winardi, 2013). The 
decision to perform actual whistleblowing is also about whether to report a wrongful 
action or not, and it depends on the available alternative and whether the benefits 
received from the whistleblowing are greater than the costs suffered (Graham, 1986). 
The indicators used to measure whistleblowing intention are (Alleyne et al., 2017; 
Alleyne, Haniffa, & Hudaib, 2016; Nayir & Herzig, 2012): 1) perception of behavior, i.e., 
one’s view of whistleblowing, is the action ethical or not; and 2) reporting channel such 
as internal reporting, external reporting, and anonymous reporting, i.e., the offense is 
reported to either internal or external parties or a trustworthy hotline. 
 
Influence of Personal Cost on Whistleblowing Intention 
 
Theory of prosocial behavior assumes that a person will do something for others to 
achieve their own, group or institution’s welfare (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986). One of the 
positive social behavior forms is whistleblowing (Miceli et al., 2008) since a 
whistleblower can put an end to errors or fraud to give benefits (Ahmad, 2011). Thus 
whistleblowing can be used as an internal and social control mechanism (Vinten, 1996). 
The theory of prosocial behavior has some antecedent which can be viewed from both 
individual and contextual perspectives (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986). From an individual 
perspective, personal cost is the determinant factor of a decision to be a whistleblower. 
According to Graham (1986), personal cost is the risk of retaliation from others within 
the institution which influences a whistleblower to report a fraud (Ponemon, 1994). The 
personal cost can be based on subjective assessment, meaning that the perceived or 
expected personal cost among employees might be different, depending on their 
assessment (Curtis, 2006). 
 
This retaliation risk makes an individual sets themselves apart from the risk when doing 
whistleblowing. The undesired consequences of a whistleblower include loss of a job, 
revenge threat, and social isolation at work (Chiu, 2003). This is what makes some 
whistleblowers opt to repot frauds anonymously. Schultz et al. (1993) define personal 
cost as an employee’s perception of retaliation/revenge risk or sanction from the 
institution members which may discourage employees from reporting it. Personal cost is 
one of the main reasons for one’s reluctance to report suspected offense (Bagustianto & 
Nurkholis, 2012). These informants believe that their reports would not be followed up, 
they will experience retaliation, or the management will not protect them from any 
retaliation threat, particularly in those types of offenses which involve their supervisors 
in the institution (Septianti, 2013). Retaliation may occur in intangible forms, such as 
imbalanced performance assessment, inhibited salary promotion, employment contract 
termination, or transfer to undesired positions (Curtis, 2006). In the results of other 
studies, it is found that the decision to be a whistleblower is considered unethical. The 
greater a person’s perception, the less likely this person to do the whistleblowing. 
 
The research conducted by Alleyne et al. (2017) finds that personal cost has a negative 
influence on internal and external whistleblowing intention. The respondents in Alleyne 
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et al. (2017) study are accountants working for government institutions in Barbados. 
Thus it makes them afraid of being retaliation victims such as being mocked, harassed, 
or intimidated by the offenders and the management. Therefore, the hypothesis 
proposed in this research is: 
 
H1: Personal cost negatively influences whistleblowing intention. 
 
Influence of Fraud Seriousness Level on Whistleblowing Intention 
 
A study finds that the decision to disclose unlawful action frequently depends on the 
nature or type of frauds committed (Miceli & Near, 1992). Miceli and Near (1985) argue 
that observers are more likely to report frauds: (1) if they have convincing evidence on 
the frauds; (2) if the frauds are serious; and (3) if they witness it in person. Another 
research has found that the more serious the issue, the more likely for whistleblowing 
to occur (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; Bagustianto & Nurkholis, 2012; S. Husniati et al., 2017; 
Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Miceli & Near, 1985; Near & Miceli, 1996; Schultz et al., 1993).
  
Every type of fraud is something unique (Miceli et al., 2008) and any institution member 
may have a different reaction to these many types of frauds (Miceli et al., 1991). 
Whether or not an institution member will react to any form of frauds might depend on 
who benefits from this action. Miceli et al. (1991) add that if the fraud is done for the 
benefit of certain individuals, then it can trigger the institution members to respond to 
it. This is because the action is deemed to only benefit the culprit and it might also 
damage the institution’s bottom line, yet if the fraud is done for the institution’s benefit, 
then it is less likely for whistleblowing to occur (Ahmad, 2011). 
 
Fraud seriousness level can be measured from how great the losses the institution 
might suffer as characterized by its materiality. Thus, an individual is more likely to 
report frauds of serious nature than the non-serious ones due to the individual’s 
perceived greater losses the institution might suffer from if it is not reported (Hanif & 
Odiatma, 2017). Additionally, an individual also shares a sense of responsibility to 
protect their workplace from any danger or loss threat (Gottshalk, 2011) as a spirit of 
prosocial theory. Phares and Wilson (1972) have also studied the importance of 
whistleblowing and fraud seriousness level. Using a scenario, Phares and Wilson find 
that in cases where the frauds are evident, and the attribution of responsibility raises 
significantly with the severity level of that action. 
 
Furthermore, Graham (1986) find that in measuring the fraud seriousness level, an 
individual should objectively examine the characteristics, frequency, and how other 
employees in the institution can be affected by the wrongful action. Previous studies 
have associated fraud seriousness level and external whistleblowing. This means when 
the fraud is serious; then the observer will reach the institution to report the action 
(King, 1997; Miceli & Near, 1984). While, the type of frauds is related to perception 
formation, fraud seriousness level cannot be measured from the type of frauds. The 
level of fraud seriousness may be varied. Several previous studies use quantitative 
perspective to measure fraud seriousness like Schultz et al. (1993) and Menk (2011) who 
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apply the materiality concept to accounting context, leading them to measure fraud 
seriousness based on the amount variation of wrongdoing/fraud/loss value as a result of 
fraud. This quantitative perspective is the easiest approach to apply since its indicators 
are clear, measurable, and easily observable (Bagustianto & Nurkholis, 2012). Setyawati 
et al. (2015) find that fraud seriousness level has a significant influence on Intention to 
do internal whistleblowing. Therefore, the hypothesis proposed in this research is as 
follows: 
 
H2: Fraud seriousness level has a positive influence on whistleblowing intention. 
 
Influence of Organizational Commitment on Whistleblowing Intention 
 
Organizational commitment is part of a prosocial theory. In prosocial theory, individual 
behavior is directed to achieve individual, group and institution’s welfare (Brief & 
Motowidlo, 1986). Every institution needs a commitment which will be the guidelines 
for its employees to do various activities in an institution (Wahyuningsih, 2016). 
Commitment as a condition where an individual side with the institution and their goals 
and to wish are to maintain their membership and support the institution in any form 
whatsoever (Hatmoko, 2006; Miftah, 2012; Robbins, 2007). An employee with high 
organizational commitment within themselves will also have a high sense of belonging 
to the organization, resulting in the absence of doubt to do the whistleblowing since 
they believe that what they do will prevent the institution from being destroyed 
(Husniati et al., 2017). 
 
Some theoretical models from studies on whistleblowing have acknowledged the 
potential influence of organizational commitment (Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Husniati et al., 
2017; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli & Near, 1988; Near & Miceli, 1985; 
Street, 1995). Street (1995) argues that if an individual has a high organizational 
commitment, they are more likely to show prosocial behavior of whistleblowing than 
when the organizational commitment yang is lower. Therefore, the hypothesis proposed 
in this research is: 
 
H3: Organizational commitment has a positive influence on whistleblowing intention. 
 
Also, this treats variable organizational commitment as an intervening variable which 
will see the influence of mediating variable organizational commitment between 
personal cost on whistleblowing intention and fraud seriousness level on whistleblowing 
intention. Organizational commitment is the variable with positive influence 
whistleblowing intention. Thus, the higher the organizational commitment, the higher 
the Intention of whistleblowers to report frauds or swindles. Therefore, the hypothesis 
proposed is: 
 
H3a: Organizational commitment mediates the relation between personal cost and 
whistleblowing intention. 
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H3b: Organizational commitment mediates the relation between fraud seriousness level 
and whistleblowing intention. 
 
 
Research Method 
 
Sample and Data Collection 
 
The respondents of this research are civil servants or contract employees working for 
government institutions of Regencies/Municipalities in Aceh Province. The sample size 
in this research is adjusted with the research model, namely PLS-SEM (Partial Least 
Square-Structural Equation Modelling). According to Hair, Hult, Ringle, and Sarstedt 
(2014:20) the sample size if PLS-SEM is used should be greater than or equal to: a) ten 
(10) times the number of greatest formative indicators used to measure a single 
construct; b) ten (10) times the number of greatest structural paths directed to certain 
constructs in a structural model. The questionnaire was distributed using the web with 
google document via google form spread to respondents via email, WhatsApp, Line, and 
other social media. The distribution was made from May to July, and at the determined 
due date, 103 questionnaires were completed. According to Hair et al. (2014:20), PLS-
SEM can be used to deal with the problem of complex correlation between variables 
with a small data sample size (30-100). 
 
Variables Measurement 
 
In this research, whistleblowing is defined as disclosing illegal, immoral or unlawful 
practices under the control of leaders by institution members, both current or former 
members, to individuals or the institution which may cause remedial action effects 
(Near & Miceli, 1985:4). There were 3 parts of whistleblowing questions, namely: 1) 
perception of whistleblowing using 6 question items measured in three ways, i.e., “yes”, 
“no”, or maybe; 2) the whistleblowing action consisting of 8 questions; 3) questions for 
whistleblowing intention using 5 point Likert scale, starting from 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree. The questions were developed by Alleyne et al. (2017), and Nayir and 
Herzig (2012) and the indicators were developed by Alleyne et al. (2016). 
 
The personal cost is the employees’ perceived retaliation/revenge risks or sanctions 
from the institution members, which may decrease employees’ interest to report 
(Schultz et al., 1993). The personal cost variable was measured using 4 question 
indicators developed by Pillay, Ramphul, Dorasamy, and Meyer (2015) using a 7-point 
Likert scale. 
 
Fraud seriousness level is defined by Hanif and Odiatma (2017) as the extent of 
consequence related to the extent of loss (or profit) received by victims (or 
beneficiaries) of morally questionable behavior. This variable was assessed using 1 
question indicator developed by Alleyne et al. (2017). The variable was measured using 
the t-point Likert scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. 
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The organizational commitment in this research was defined by Mowday, Steers, and 
Porter (1979) as a relative strength in identifying individual involvement in a certain 
institution. This variable was measured using positive and negative statements. There 
were 8 statement indicators developed by Mowday et al. (1979) to assess the 
organizational commitment variable. This variable was measured using a 7-point Likert 
scale. In this research, organizational commitment served as both an independent and 
intervening variable. 
 
Data Analysis Method 
 
The data were analyzed using PLS-SEM (Partial Least Square-Structural Equation 
Modelling) with WarpPLS 4.0 application. The researchers used PLS-SEM since this 
research had complex variables and it had direct and indirect influence tests with the 
organizational commitment playing the mediating role. 
 
  
Result and Discussion 
 
Descriptive Statistic of Research Variable  
 
This research was complemented with research questions on the respondent’s 
perception of whistleblowing and whistleblowing action. Table 1 shows the 
respondents’ demographic profiles while the research result on perception of 
whistleblowing can be seen in Table 2. The research result showed that 61% of the 
respondents agree that whistleblowing was part of ethics and only 46.6% of the 
respondents were willing to report offenses to the management, and 53.4% of them 
would report offenses to a trustworthy channel/line within the agency they were 
working and 50.5% would not report to a line beyond the organization, and even 70.9% 
of the respondents would not report it to media, and finally only 32% were willing to 
report to supervisory board. 
 
Table 1 Presents a Summary of 103 Respondents’ Demographic Profiles 
No Characteristics Responden Frequency (N) Percentage (%) 
1 Regency/Municipality 
Banda Aceh 
Sabang 
Great Aceh  
Pidie 
Pidie Jaya 
Bireuen 
Lhokseumawe 
West Aceh  
Aceh Jaya 
Simeulue 
Nagan Raya 
Southwest Aceh  
South Aceh 
Aceh Singkil 
Subulussalam 
 
16 
2 
6 
4 
3 
15 
4 
7 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
0 
 
15.5 
1.9 
5.8 
3.9 
2.9 
14.6 
3.9 
6.8 
2.9 
1.9 
1 
1 
1 
1.9 
0 
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Table 1 Presents a Summary of 103 Respondents’ Demographic Profiles (Continued) 
No Characteristics Responden Frequency (N) Percentage (%) 
1 Regency/Municipality 
North Aceh  
Langsa 
East Aceh  
Aceh Tamiang 
Central Aceh  
Bener Meriah 
Gayo Lues 
Southeast Aceh  
Total 
 
3 
14 
2 
4 
5 
4 
3 
1 
103 
 
2.9 
13.6 
1.9 
3.9 
4.9 
3.9 
2.9 
1 
100 
2 Sex 
1. Male 
2. Female 
3. Total 
 
42 
61 
103 
 
40.8 
59.2 
100 
3 Age 
a. 20-30 years old 
b. 30-40 years old 
c. 40-50 years old 
d. > 50 years old 
e. Total 
 
24 
38 
31 
10 
103 
 
23.3 
36.9 
30.1 
9.7 
100 
4 Religion 
Islam 
Christianity 
Hinduism 
Buddhism 
Total 
 
103 
0 
0 
0 
103 
 
100 
0 
0 
0 
100 
5 Last Education 
1. Senior High School/equal 
2. Diploma (D1/D2/D3) 
3. Bachelor (S1) 
4. Master (S2) 
5. Doctoral (S3) 
6. Total 
 
2 
17 
53 
30 
1 
103 
 
2 
16.5 
51.4 
29.1 
1 
100 
6 Status 
1. Civil Servants 
2. Contract Employees  
3. Total 
 
83 
20 
103 
 
80.6 
19.4 
100 
7 Work Experience 
< 1 year 
1-5 years 
6-15 years 
16-25 years 
> 25 years 
Total 
 
3 
20 
48 
22 
10 
103 
 
2.9 
19.4 
46.6 
21.4 
9.7 
100 
8 Fields of Occupation  
Administrative Field 
Financial Field 
Staffing Field 
Others 
Total 
 
36 
21 
9 
37 
103 
 
35 
20.4 
8.7 
35.9 
100 
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Table 1 Presents a Summary of 103 Respondents’ Demographic Profiles (Continued) 
No Characteristics Responden Frequency (N) Percentage (%) 
9 Position 
Secretary 
Agency Head 
Bureau Head 
Division Head 
Board Head 
Sub-division Head 
Sub-board Head 
Section Head 
Administrative Head 
Room Head  
Staff 
Others 
Total 
 
2 
1 
1 
2 
4 
4 
1 
4 
2 
1 
51 
30 
103 
 
1.9 
1 
1 
1.9 
3.9 
3.9 
1 
3.9 
1.9 
1 
49.5 
29.1 
100 
 
The results of this research indicated that respondents felt safer to report the offense 
internally than to external parties or media. This was the same as Carson, Verdo, and 
Wokutch (2008) and Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) who found that external 
whistleblowing was more dangerous than internal whistleblowing for it could lead to 
retaliation and serious damage to the institution. 
 
Table 2 Respondent’s Response to Whistleblowing Perception 
No Question 
Answer Score  
Yes No Maybe 
1 Do you see whistleblowing as an ethic? 
63 
61.2% 
18 
17.5% 
22 
21.4% 
2 
Will you prefer to report offenses to the 
management within the institution you 
are working for? 
48 
46.6% 
24 
23.3% 
31 
30.1% 
3 
Will you prefer to report offenses to a 
trustworthy channel/line within the 
institution you are currently working for? 
55 
53.4% 
26 
25.2% 
22 
21.4% 
4 
Will you prefer to report offenses to a 
trustworthy channel/line beyond the 
institution you are currently working for? 
25 
24.3% 
52 
50.5% 
26 
25.2% 
5 
Will you prefer to report offenses to the 
media? 
5 
4.9% 
73 
70.9% 
25 
24.3% 
6 
Will you prefer to report to the 
supervisory board? 
33 
32% 
37 
35.9% 
33 
32% 
 
 This research also explores the respondent’s response to whistleblowing action which 
can be seen in Table 3. It can be seen that 41 (39.8%) respondents had noticed or seen 
offenses within the institution. Out of these 41 respondents who noticed offenses, 
12.2% did the whistleblowing action by directly talking to the offenders, 26.8% told the 
higher management, 7.3% reported to the authority beyond the institution, 22% did 
nothing, and the whistleblowing action most commonly done was informing about it to 
the trustworthy channel/line in the institution at 31.7%. 
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Table 3 Respondent’s Response to Whistleblowing Action 
No Factor Frequency (N) Percent (%) 
1 Aware of/noticing fraud  
Yes  
No 
Total 
 
41 
62 
103 
 
39.8 
60.2 
100 
2 Whistleblowing Action 
Directly talking to the offender 
Informing the higher management 
Informing to trustworthy channel/line in the institution 
Writing an incident report 
Informing the media/external agency 
Reporting to the authority beyond the institution 
Doing nothing 
Total 
 
5 
11 
13 
0 
0 
3 
9 
41 
 
12,2 
26,8 
31,7 
0 
0 
7,3 
22 
100 
 
The respondents’ response to whistleblowing intention can be seen in Table 4. The 
results for the personal cost variable can be seen in Table 5. The mean score of the 
respondents was 5.571. This showed that the respondent’s perception of retaliation was 
high, yet among the questions on personal cost, the statement with the highest mean 
score was whistleblower’s reluctance to be covered by media, i.e., at 5.641. 
 
Table 4 Respondent’s Response to Whistleblowing Intention 
No Statement 
Answer Score 
Mean 
SD D N A SA 
1 
I will report it using a 
pseudonym. 
10 
9.7% 
18 
17.5% 
33 
32% 
28 
27.2% 
14 
13.6% 
3.17 
2 
I will report offenses, but I will 
not give any information about 
myself. 
4 
3.9% 
22 
21.4% 
34 
33% 
28 
27.2% 
15 
14.6% 
3.27 
3 
I will report offenses to the 
authority beyond the 
institution I am working for. 
18 
17.5% 
34 
33% 
29 
28.2% 
13 
12.6% 
9 
8.7% 
2.62 
4 
I will give information to 
external parties. 
25 
24.3% 
39 
37.9% 
25 
24.3% 
8 
7.8% 
6 
5.8% 
2.33 
5 I will tell the public about it. 
26 
25.2% 
42 
40.8% 
20 
19.4% 
8 
7.8% 
7 
6.8% 
2.30 
6 
I will report to the right person 
within the institution. 
2 
1.9% 
13 
12.6% 
26 
25.2% 
37 
35.9% 
25 
24.3% 
3.68 
7 
I will use a reporting 
line/channel within the 
institution. 
3 
2.9% 
16 
15.5% 
26 
25.2% 
39 
37.9% 
19 
18.4% 
3.53 
8 
I will tell the internal supervisor 
about it. 
3 
2.9% 
18 
17.5% 
34 
33% 
33 
32% 
15 
14.6% 
3.28 
Average 3.02 
Note: SD=Strongly Disagree; D=disagree; N=Neutral; A=Agree; SA=Strongly Agree 
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Table 5 Respondent’s Response to Personal Cost and Organizational Commitment Variables  
No Statement 
Answer Score 
Mean 
SD D LD N LA A SA 
Personal cost 
1 I will not be a 
whistleblower because 
the leader’s power is very 
high and rigid. 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
17 
16.5% 
38 
36.9% 
26 
25.2% 
22 
21.4% 
5.515 
2 I do not want to be a 
whistleblower because 
my institution will make a 
retaliation to me. 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
20 
19.4% 
28 
27.2% 
38 
36.9% 
17 
16.5% 
5.505 
3 I do not want to be a 
whistleblower because 
the people involved in 
illegal, immoral, or 
prohibited practices in my 
institution might 
retaliate. 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
11 
10.7% 
37 
35.9% 
35 
34% 
20 
19.4% 
5.621 
4 I do not want to be a 
whistleblower if I am to 
be covered by the media. 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
15 
14.6% 
28 
27.2% 
39 
37.9% 
21 
20.4% 
5.641 
Average        5.571 
Organizational Commitment SD D LD N LA A SA  
1 Trying and working 
harder to help the 
institution achieve its 
goals. 
6 
5.8% 
2 
1.9% 
2 
1.9% 
10 
9.7% 
10 
9.7% 
29 
28.2% 
44 
42.7% 
5.709 
2 Telling friends that the 
institution I am working 
for is a good organization. 
3 
2.9% 
2 
1.9% 
5 
4.9% 
17 
16.5% 
17 
16.5% 
31 
30.1% 
28 
27.2% 
5.408 
3 Willing to accept any kind 
of assignment to continue 
to work for the 
institution. 
1 
1% 
7 
6.8% 
8 
7.8% 
11 
10.7% 
30 
29.1% 
34 
33% 
12 
11.7% 
5.058 
4 The values applied to the 
institution share some 
similarities with the 
values I follow. 
1 
1% 
7 
6.8% 
7 
6.8% 
14 
13.6% 
32 
31.1% 
30 
29.2% 
12 
11.7% 
5.010 
5 Proud to tell others since 
(I am) part of the 
institution. 
6 
5.8% 
12 
11.7% 
8 
7.8% 
22 
21.4% 
23 
22.3% 
18 
17.5% 
14 
13.6% 
4.495 
6 The institution I am 
working for inspires me 
to improve my 
performance. 
2 
1.9% 
8 
7.8% 
3 
2.9% 
11 
10.7% 
19 
18.4% 
40 
38.8% 
20 
19.4% 
5.301 
7 Frequently find it hard to 
agree with the 
institution’s policy on 
important matters 
related to its employees. 
8 
7.8% 
6 
5.8% 
2 
1.9% 
12 
11.7% 
7 
6.8% 
39 
37.9% 
29 
28.2% 
5.301 
8 The institution I am 
working for is the best 
compared to other 
institutions. 
1 
1% 
7 
6.8% 
7 
6.8% 
16 
15.5% 
28 
27.2% 
32 
31.1% 
12 
11.7% 
5.010 
Mean        5.162 
Note: SD=Strongly Disagree; D=disagree; LD=Slightly Disagree; N=Neutral; LA=Slightly Agree; A=Agree; 
SA=Strongly Agree 
  
Based on Table 5, the mean score of the respondent’s response to organizational 
commitment was 5.162, indicating that respondents slightly agreed with organizational 
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commitment. The statement with the greatest mean was trying and working harder to 
help the institution achieve its goals at 5.079. On the contrary, the statement proud to 
tell others that (I am) part of the institution was the one with the least mean score at 
4.495. The fraud seriousness level at Government Institutions of Regencies/ 
Municipalities in Aceh Province was moderate, i.e., it was not too high yet not too low 
either. This was shown by the mean score of the respondent’s response to fraud 
seriousness level variable at 2.91 on Table 6. 
 
Table 6 Respondent’s Response to Variable Fraud Seriousness Level 
No Statement 
Answer Score 
Mean 
VL L N H VH 
1 
Score the seriousness level of 
frauds occurring in the 
institution you are working for. 
8 
7.8% 
31 
30.1% 
34 
33% 
22 
21.4% 
8 
7.8% 
2.91 
Note: VL=Very Low; L=Low; N=Neutral; H=High; VH= Very High 
 
Results of Hypothesis Testing 
 
Results of Outer Model Test 
 
The outer model test was conducted to assess the reliability and validity of indicators 
which form the latent variable. According to Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2010) the 
loading factor which qualifies the criteria is above 0.70, and Ghozali and Latan (2014) 
suggest that for social research the loading factor value over 0.50 is acceptable. If an 
indicator is below 0.50, then these indicators are eliminated for processing. The 
resulting loading factors for whistleblowing intention, personal cost, organizational 
commitment, and fraud seriousness level upon eliminating the loading factor below 
0.50 can be seen in Table 7. 
 
According to Table 7, we can see the values of loading factor, CR (Composite Reliability), 
AVE (Average Variance Extracted), and square root AVE (√AVE). The result of reliability 
test showed a good result for whistleblowing intention, personal cost, organizational 
commitment, and fraud seriousness level since the CR values of each variable were 
0.843 (IW), 0.853 (PC), 0.922 (KO), dan 1.000 (KK) which were greater than 0.70. The 
instrument’s internal consistency level was also high, as could be seen from Cronbach’s 
Alpha ≥ 0.50. The validity test for each variable also showed a good result as could be 
seen from the AVE value which was greater than > 0.50 and √AVE of each variable was 
greater than AVE value. 
 
Result of Inner Model Test 
 
The inner model test was used to determine whether the research hypotheses were 
confirmed or rejected. The summary of its result can be seen in Table 8. In Table 8, it 
was shown that personal cost had path coefficients of -0.250 and p-value=0.030, 
meaning it was less than 0.05. Thus H1 was confirmed. Therefore it could be concluded 
that the personal cost variable has a direct negative influence on whistleblowing 
intention. In other words, the higher the personal cost, the lower the whistleblowing 
Indriani, Yulia, Nadirsyah, & Ariska 
Whistleblowing Intention, Personal Cost, Organizational Commitment and Fraud Seriousness Level 
 
 
Journal of Accounting and Investment, May 2019 | 143 
intention would be. This result indicated that respondents had no interest to be a 
whistleblower for they were afraid of possible retaliation if they reported something 
improper occurring at work. 
 
Table 7 Result of Outer Model Test 
Variable Indicator 
Loading 
Factor 
≥0.50 
CR 
≥0.70 
AVE 
> 50% 
√AVE 
Cron-
bach’s 
alpha 
Whistleblowing 
Intention 
IW1 0.739 0.843 0.520 0.721 0.78 
IW2 0.743 
IW3 0.801 
IW4 0.619 
IW5 0.689 
Personal cost P1 0.770 0.853 0.595 0.771 0.77 
P2 0.848 
P3 0.819 
P4 0.630 
Organizational 
commitment 
KO1 0.561 0.922 0.636 0.798 0.90 
KO2 0.648 
KO3 0.920 
KO4 0.929 
KO6 0.645 
KO7 0.918 
KO8 0.868 
Fraud seriousness 
level 
KK1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.99 
 
This research supported Alleyne et al. (2017); Lestari and Yaya (2017); and Setyawati et 
al. (2015) who explained that whistleblower was concerned that they might be 
subjected to retaliation from the offender or the management. This action had no 
serious effect on the whistleblower, as well as on the management procedure and the 
organization, thus the whistleblower needed support and self-confidence in the internal 
reporting process, yet this research was inconsistent with Bagustianto and Nurkholis 
(2012) who found that personal cost influenced whistleblowing intention. 
Table 8 Results of Hypothesis Testing 
 Hypothesis Coefficient p value Conclusion 
Direct Relation 
PC-IW  
KK-IW 
KO-IW 
PC-KO (unhypothesized) 
KK-KO (unhypothesized) 
 
H1 
H2 
H3 
- 
- 
 
-0,25 
0.27 
0.05 
0.10 
0.11 
 
0.03 
0.01 
0.33 
0.28 
0.17 
 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Indirect relations 
PC-KO-IW 
KK-KO-IW 
 
H3a 
H3b 
 
0.005 
0.006 
 
0.411 
0.336 
 
Rejected 
Rejected 
 R2= 0.127 IW 
 R2 =0.024 KO 
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Fraud seriousness level had a path coefficient of 0.27 and p-value = 0.009. Thus H2 was 
confirmed. This means fraud seriousness level has a direct positive influence on 
whistleblowing intention at a regression coefficient of 0.265 and significant at 0.009. 
This result indicated that respondents would only report fraud at a certain seriousness 
or materiality level. The organization members within them had no awareness yet that a 
public organization, particularly government organization, even the slightest fraud 
would lead to great losses. Thus one intended to report it if the fraud was serious. This 
result confirmed Setyawati et al. (2015), yet this result contradicted Hanif and Odiatma 
(2017) who investigated police members at Pekan Baru municipality. 
 
The organizational commitment had a path coefficient of 0.05 and p-value=0.331. Thus 
H3 was rejected. This means organizational commitment did does not influence 
whistleblowing intention. This result rejected Street (1995) who suggested that if a 
person had a high organizational commitment, their prosocial value would increase and, 
hence, it was more likely for them to disclose something improper at work since they 
had the sense of responsibility of what happened. This result was not different from 
Lestari and Yaya (2017) and Setyawati et al. (2015). 
 
This result also showed that organizational commitment had no mediating effect on the 
relationship between personal cost and whistleblowing intention as could be seen from 
the coefficient value at 0.054 with p-value = 0.411. The organizational commitment had 
no mediating effect either on the relation between fraud seriousness level and 
whistleblowing intention as could be seen from the coefficient value of 0.331 with p-
value = 0.366. Therefore, it could be concluded that the organizational commitment 
variable could not influence the relationships among personal cost, fraud seriousness 
level, and whistleblowing intention. 
 
The value of R2 was 0.127 in whistleblowing intention variable, meaning 12.7% of 
changes in the whistleblowing intention variable could be explained by the changes in 
the personal cost, organizational commitment, and fraud seriousness level variables, 
and the remaining 89.9% was explained by other variables beyond the model. The value 
of R2 was 0.024 in organizational commitment variable. This means 0.4% of changes in 
the organizational commitment variable could be explained in the changes in personal 
cost and fraud seriousness level variables, with the remaining 99.6% being explained by 
other variables beyond the model. Furthermore, Q2 of whistleblowing intention and 
organizational commitment variables showed respective values of 0.143 and 0.037. 
Hence, it could be concluded that the model had a predictive relevance. 
 
Goodness of Fit 
 
The result of the goodness of fit test of the overall model can be seen in Table 9. It can 
be seen that the model had fairly good fit. This was shown by the p-value of APC 
(Average Path Coefficient) = 0.004 and APC, ARS (Average R-Square), and AARS (Average 
Adjusted R-Square) values respectively at 0.156, 0.075, and 0.052. Moreover, the 
resulting AVIF (Average block VIF) and AFVIF (Average Adjusted R-Square) values < 3.3, 
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meaning that no multicollinearity was found between indicators and between 
exogenous (independent) variables.  
 
Table 9 Model Goodness of Fit Test 
Indicator 
The goodness of Fit Level 
Target 
Estimation Result 
Goodness of Fit 
Level 
APC 
> 0.05 
p ≤ 0.05 
APC = 0. 156 
p = 0.004 
Good Fit 
ARS > 0.05 0.075 Good Fit 
AARS > 0.05 0.052 Good Fit 
AVIF 
Ideally ≤ 0.03, yet ≤ 5 is still 
acceptable 
1.013 Good Fit 
AFVIF 
 
Ideally ≤ 0.03, yet ≤ 5 is still 
acceptable 
1.089 Good Fit 
GoF 
≥ 0.10 (small) 
≥ 0.25 (medium) 
≥ 0.36 (big) 
0.228 Small 
SPR 
Ideally = 1, yet ≥ 0.7 is still 
acceptable 
1.000 Good Fit 
RSCR 
Ideally = 1, yet ≥ 0.7 is still 
acceptable 
1.000 Good Fit 
SSR Should be ≥ 0.7 1.000 Good Fit 
NLBCDR Should be ≥ 0.7 0.500 Not too good 
 
The result of GoF was 0.228, meaning that the model was relatively small. SPR 
(Symson’s Paradox), RSCR (R-square Contribution Ratio), and SSR (Statistical Suppression 
Ratio) generated the same value, i.e., 1. This means no causality problem was found in 
the model. On the contrary, NLBCDR (Nonlinear Bivariate Causality Direction Ratio) 
value was 0.5 or < 0.7,  meaning that it was not too good, yet this not-too-good NLBCDR 
in this research which was intended for hypothesis testing purpose had no influence 
since NLBCDR index was currently recommended for experimental research (Ghozali & 
Latan, 2014). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The research results indicated that personal cost had a negative influence on Intention 
to do the whistleblowing. This means that the higher the personal cost, the lower the 
whistleblowing intention would be. On the contrary, the lower the personal cost, the 
higher the whistleblowing intention would be. This research showed that respondents 
were discouraged from being a whistleblower since they were afraid of the retaliation 
they might receive, even though respondents were aware that fraud happened at their 
workplace. 
 
The research results also indicated that fraud seriousness level had a significant positive 
influence on the Intention to do whistleblowing, meaning that the higher the fraud 
seriousness level, the higher the whistleblowing intention or, the lower the fraud 
seriousness level, the lower the whistleblowing intention would be. This research failed 
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to prove that commitment had some influence on whistleblowing intention, and that 
organizational commitment was expected to play a mediating role in this research. 
Therefore, the prosocial theory used in this research could only support the influence of 
personal cost and whistleblowing intention and fraud seriousness level on 
whistleblowing intention, yet it failed to explain the influence of organizational 
commitment on whistleblowing intention. 
 
As its implication, the research results could be taken into consideration to make 
policies on the importance of building whistleblowing in an organization and as the basis 
for an organization to make a policy which can mitigate personal cost, preventing 
personal cost from being the reason for an individual’s reluctance to be a whistleblower. 
The research results can also be used as a reference for accounting researchers in 
determining the factors influencing whistleblowing intention for future research. 
 
This research has its limitations, including its use of a questionnaire which may cause 
problems if the respondent’s answer is different from the real state of affairs. It can 
even be worse if the questionnaire is completed not by the respondents needed in this 
research. Such a situation is beyond the control and power of the researchers. Another 
limitation of this research is that it is conducted in Aceh Province. Thus its 
generalizability might be too low for other regions in Indonesia. As has commonly been 
known, Indonesia has 34 provinces with highly diverse cultures one another, and it is 
possible for this diversity to influence the psychological aspects of the respondents in 
viewing something. 
 
It is suggested for further research also to observe other variables which may influence 
whistleblowing intention, particularly those which can influence the relation between 
personal cost and whistleblowing intention. It is expected that these variables would 
lessen the whistleblowers’ fear of retaliation they might receive. These variables can be 
organizational support and quality of the system as a channel the whistleblower can 
use. Additionally, these variables are expected to influence the relation between fraud 
seriousness level and whistleblowing intention in such a way that no matter how trivial 
the fraud is occurring in the organization it will still be reported if the organizational 
support and system quality are adequate. 
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